Reviewed: November 20, 2026 · Data window: March 31 to September 30, 2026 · Sample: 17 institutional 13F reporting groups and 1,179 manager–security positions comparable across all three quarter-ends
Why did the matched Q3 13F value slip even though the securities’ implied unit values added $5.54 billion? Share-count changes more than offset it. Across the same 1,179 manager–security positions, the Q2→Q3 quantity effect was −$6.76 billion, or 122.0% of the positive valuation effect, leaving a net reported-value decline of $1.22 billion. Removing Bridgewater does not reverse the answer: the quantity effect was −$7.88 billion against +$6.21 billion of valuation effect, an offset of 126.9%.
This is a two-factor bridge for continuing disclosed positions—not a performance return, cash-flow statement or reconstruction of trades. Form 13F supplies quarter-end shares and fair value, but not transaction dates, cost basis, motives, short exposure or the manager’s complete assets.
Three findings
- The mechanism changed between quarters. For the same cohort, Q1→Q2 combined a +$3.55 billion quantity effect with +$53.49 billion of valuation effect. Q2→Q3 combined a −$6.76 billion quantity effect with +$5.54 billion of valuation effect.
- The result was not simply Bridgewater’s large row count. Excluding Bridgewater makes the negative quantity effect larger, not smaller, relative to the positive valuation effect.
- Manager and issuer paths diverged. Twelve of 17 managers had a negative net quantity effect, while only five were positive. Apple’s +$9.98 billion valuation effect dominated its matched value gain; Alphabet combined a −$2.40 billion quantity effect with a −$1.19 billion valuation effect.
The same positions changed from reinforcement to offset
| Matched-position bridge | Q1→Q2 | Q2→Q3 |
|---|---|---|
| Opening reported value | $394.95bn | $452.00bn |
| Closing reported value | $452.00bn | $450.78bn |
| Quantity effect | +$3.55bn | −$6.76bn |
| Valuation effect | +$53.49bn | +$5.54bn |
| Net reported-value change | +$57.05bn | −$1.22bn |
| Gross quantity share of both absolute effects | 42.5% | 42.6% |
The Q1→Q2 and Q2→Q3 gross quantity shares were nearly identical—42.47% and 42.59%—but their signs were different. In Q2, net share-count changes reinforced the positive valuation effect. In Q3, they overwhelmed it. That is why a flat or falling reported value cannot be read as “prices fell,” and a rising value cannot automatically be called buying.
Manager bridges: 12 negative quantity effects, five positive
| Manager | Matched positions | Quantity effect | Valuation effect | Net change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Berkshire Hathaway | 28 | −$1.17bn | +$5.43bn | +$4.25bn |
| Coatue | 53 | +$2.39bn | −$1.67bn | +$728m |
| Bridgewater | 643 | +$1.13bn | −$674m | +$454m |
| Tiger Global | 36 | −$4.18bn | +$126m | −$4.06bn |
| ARK | 160 | +$189m | +$1.31bn | +$1.50bn |
| Whale Rock | 25 | −$599m | −$1.18bn | −$1.78bn |
| Pershing Square | 8 | −$1.56bn | +$689m | −$871m |
| Fundsmith | 27 | −$1.95bn | +$390m | −$1.56bn |
| Icahn reporting group | 9 | −$212m | +$1.56bn | +$1.35bn |
| Appaloosa | 15 | −$130m | −$194m | −$324m |
| Altimeter | 10 | +$248m | +$699m | +$947m |
| Soros Fund Management | 97 | −$433m | −$34m | −$467m |
| Third Point | 14 | −$162m | −$310m | −$472m |
| Situational Awareness | 4 | −$341m | −$261m | −$602m |
| Greenlight / DME | 32 | −$13m | −$331m | −$345m |
| Light Street | 15 | +$47m | −$35m | +$12m |
| Dalal Street | 3 | −$8m | +$23m | +$16m |
Berkshire Hathaway illustrates the distinction. Its matched positions gained $4.25 billion in reported value even though the quantity effect was −$1.17 billion, because the valuation effect was +$5.43 billion. Tiger Global’s matched cohort moved the other way: a −$4.18 billion quantity effect dominated a small +$0.13 billion valuation effect. Neither result identifies when shares changed or why.
The largest issuer bridges were not all the same
| Security | Managers | Quantity effect | Valuation effect | Net change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apple | 3 | −$71m | +$9.98bn | +$9.91bn |
| American Express | 2 | +$25m | −$5.18bn | −$5.16bn |
| Alphabet | 8 | −$2.40bn | −$1.19bn | −$3.60bn |
| Chevron | 2 | −$24m | +$3.24bn | +$3.22bn |
| Meta Platforms | 9 | +$1.00bn | +$2.27bn | +$3.27bn |
| Bank of America | 2 | −$1.60bn | −$1.16bn | −$2.76bn |
| Microsoft | 7 | −$26m | +$2.11bn | +$2.09bn |
| Coca-Cola | 3 | +$1m | +$1.93bn | +$1.93bn |
| Occidental Petroleum | 1 | $0m | +$1.79bn | +$1.79bn |
| Lam Research | 5 | −$309m | −$1.46bn | −$1.77bn |
Apple’s matched value gain was almost entirely valuation, while Meta combined positive quantity and valuation effects. Alphabet and Bank of America combined negative effects from both channels. Delta Air Lines, outside the top-ten table, is a useful counterexample: a +$670 million quantity effect was almost fully offset by a −$658 million valuation effect, leaving only about +$12 million of net change.
Method, scope and limitations
- Periods and sample: March 31, June 30 and September 30, 2026 quarter-end holdings for AHNIM’s fixed 17 institutional reporting groups. The bridge uses 1,179 positions matched by reporting group and CUSIP across all three quarter-ends.
- Included instruments: continuing eligible long operating-company equity rows. ETFs/ETPs, options, debt, warrants, preferred shares, principal-amount rows and quarantined identifiers remain excluded under the standing method.
- Unmatched rows: a security missing from the three-quarter matched set is not converted into a zero, sale or full exit. New and disappeared positions therefore do not enter this bridge.
- Corporate actions: Q1→Q2 retains previously verified split adjustments. A Q2→Q3 ratio screen found no unresolved corporate-action hit among the matched rows; unmatched identifier migrations stay outside the calculation.
- Decomposition: the sequential bridge values the share-count change at the opening implied unit value, then applies the unit-value change to closing shares. Reconciliation error was below one cent after floating-point calculation.
- Interpretation: quantity effect is not cash flow or trade timing; valuation effect is not portfolio return. The matched aggregate is not unique AUM because the same security can be disclosed by multiple managers.
The prior Q1→Q2 share-count-versus-valuation bridge provides the earlier-quarter baseline. Our Q3 persistence test asks a different question—whether the same position expanded in both intervals—while the Guru research hub keeps the fixed panel and related reports together.
Sources and original documents
SEC, Frequently Asked Questions About Form 13F (updated March 6, 2026); SEC Form 13F and instructions; SEC Form 13F data sets.
Direct Q3 2026 filing indexes:
Altimeter; Appaloosa; ARK; Berkshire Hathaway; Bridgewater; Coatue; Dalal Street; Greenlight / DME; Fundsmith; Icahn reporting group; Light Street; Pershing Square 13F-NT notice and combination 13F-HR; Situational Awareness; Soros Fund Management; Third Point; Tiger Global; Whale Rock.
Direct Q1 and Q2 filing indexes and the prior-period normalization record are preserved in the sources section of the completed Q1→Q2 bridge.
AHNIM STUDIO calculation from the cited filings. This article is for information and education, not investment advice. Data and assumptions can be revised if an amendment or verified corporate action changes the normalized comparison.

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