Reviewed: November 18, 2026 · Data window: March 31 to June 30, 2026 · Sample: 17 institutional 13F reporting groups, 1,396 clean continuing manager–security observations
Which managers showed the most offset between positive and negative share-count effects inside their own continuing 13F positions? Appaloosa and Whale Rock led this 17-manager panel: opposite-signed quantity effects offset 91.99% and 91.53%, respectively, of each manager’s gross absolute effect. Across the full panel, within-manager offset removed 43.39% of a $65.58 billion observation-level gross effect before the 17 manager nets were combined. Cross-manager offset then removed another 74.05% of the $37.12 billion gross absolute manager net, leaving a panel net of +$9.63 billion.
This is an arithmetic decomposition of two quarter-end disclosures—not a measure of transaction volume, realized performance, conviction, or the timing and motive of any transaction. It covers only positions that survived our identifier and corporate-action controls in both quarters.
Three findings
- Appaloosa and Whale Rock had the highest within-manager offset ratios. Appaloosa’s +$0.67 billion and −$0.78 billion gross sides produced a −$0.12 billion net; Whale Rock’s +$1.10 billion and −$1.30 billion gross sides produced a −$0.20 billion net.
- Offset was large at two different layers. Netting opposite signs inside each manager reduced $65.58 billion of observation-level gross absolute effects to $37.12 billion of absolute manager nets. Netting those 17 manager-level results reduced the remainder to +$9.63 billion.
- A high ratio does not necessarily mean a large economic effect. Light Street ranked third at 84.64%, but its $0.17 billion gross absolute denominator was much smaller than Appaloosa’s $1.45 billion or Whale Rock’s $2.40 billion.
What the offset ratio measures
For each clean continuing manager–security observation, we estimate a symmetric-midpoint quantity effect:
Quantity effect = (Q2 split-adjusted shares − Q1 split-adjusted shares) × average of Q1 and Q2 implied unit values
Within each manager, we add positive effects and negative effects separately. The manager offset ratio is:
Offset ratio = 1 − |net quantity effect| ÷ (gross positive effect + |gross negative effect|)
A 100% ratio would mean positive and negative effects were equal in magnitude. A 0% ratio would mean they all pointed the same way. The statistic deliberately ignores whether the effects came from one large holding or many small ones; the gross-dollar denominator provides that scale context separately.
The two-stage arithmetic
| Layer | Gross positive | Gross negative | Gross absolute | Net | Offset ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manager–security observations | $37.60bn | −$27.97bn | $65.58bn | +$9.63bn | 85.31% overall |
| Within managers | — | — | $65.58bn | $37.12bn absolute manager nets | 43.39% |
| Across manager nets | — | — | $37.12bn | +$9.63bn panel net | 74.05% |
The panel’s equal-weight mean manager offset ratio was 50.85%, while its median was 58.65%. Those figures describe the typical manager without letting a very large gross denominator dominate. The 43.39% within-manager figure instead weights each manager by its gross absolute effect.
Manager-by-manager results
| Manager | Clean positions | Inc / Dec / Unch | Gross positive | Gross negative | Net | Offset |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Appaloosa | 18 | 10 / 5 / 3 | $0.67bn | −$0.78bn | −$0.12bn | 91.99% |
| Whale Rock | 28 | 7 / 18 / 3 | $1.10bn | −$1.30bn | −$0.20bn | 91.53% |
| Light Street | 19 | 11 / 7 / 1 | $0.07bn | −$0.10bn | −$0.03bn | 84.64% |
| Altimeter | 10 | 5 / 3 / 2 | $0.29bn | −$0.40bn | −$0.12bn | 83.24% |
| Soros Fund Management | 138 | 43 / 72 / 23 | $0.54bn | −$0.76bn | −$0.22bn | 83.19% |
| Greenlight / DME | 38 | 11 / 10 / 17 | $0.20bn | −$0.14bn | +$0.06bn | 82.96% |
| Pershing Square | 9 | 4 / 3 / 2 | $1.06bn | −$0.74bn | +$0.32bn | 82.25% |
| Coatue | 56 | 8 / 22 / 26 | $3.83bn | −$2.09bn | +$1.73bn | 70.71% |
| Bridgewater | 769 | 390 / 375 / 4 | $3.31bn | −$7.97bn | −$4.66bn | 58.65% |
| ARK | 166 | 77 / 88 / 1 | $0.69bn | −$2.05bn | −$1.36bn | 50.40% |
| Berkshire Hathaway | 28 | 7 / 6 / 15 | $17.28bn | −$3.81bn | +$13.46bn | 36.16% |
| Tiger Global | 37 | 6 / 20 / 11 | $0.47bn | −$4.17bn | −$3.70bn | 20.38% |
| Third Point | 21 | 13 / 4 / 4 | $1.03bn | −$0.11bn | +$0.92bn | 19.94% |
| Situational Awareness | 17 | 10 / 3 / 4 | $7.06bn | −$0.17bn | +$6.89bn | 4.73% |
| Icahn reporting group | 11 | 1 / 2 / 8 | $0.002bn | −$0.17bn | −$0.17bn | 1.89% |
| Fundsmith | 28 | 4 / 21 / 3 | $0.02bn | −$3.18bn | −$3.16bn | 1.37% |
| Dalal Street | 3 | 1 / 2 / 0 | <$0.001bn | −$0.017bn | −$0.017bn | 0.40% |
What Appaloosa and Whale Rock show
Appaloosa’s ratio did not come from a tiny denominator. Its gross absolute quantity effect was $1.45 billion: $0.67 billion positive and $0.78 billion negative. The near balance left a net of −$0.12 billion. Whale Rock’s gross absolute denominator was larger at $2.40 billion, but the same arithmetic pattern held: $1.10 billion positive against $1.30 billion negative left −$0.20 billion.
The statistic therefore adds information that a net-only table loses. A reader seeing only −$0.12 billion for Appaloosa or −$0.20 billion for Whale Rock could miss the substantially larger opposite-signed components underneath. However, this does not establish when shares changed, whether the manager initiated the change, or why it happened. A 13F reports quarter-end long positions, not a transaction ledger.
The low-ratio end illustrates the opposite case. Fundsmith’s −$3.16 billion net retained 98.63% of its $3.21 billion gross absolute effect, while Situational Awareness’s +$6.89 billion net retained 95.27% of its $7.23 billion gross effect. Those quarter-over-quarter quantity effects were much more one-sided within the clean continuing subset. Again, “one-sided” describes only this decomposition; it is not a claim about the manager’s total portfolio activity.
Why these gross totals differ from our issuer-level article
Our earlier issuer-level concentration analysis reported $28.77 billion of positive effects and $19.13 billion of negative effects, or $47.90 billion gross. This article reports $37.60 billion positive and $27.97 billion negative, or $65.58 billion gross. The difference is deliberate.
The earlier article first aggregated every manager’s observation to the issuer level, then split issuers into positive and negative buckets. Opposite manager directions in the same issuer were already netted before its gross total was calculated. Here we preserve each manager–security observation through the first stage, then measure offset inside each manager. Both paths reconcile to the same +$9.63 billion panel net.
Method, inclusion rules and current-period status
- Period: holdings reported for March 31 and June 30, 2026. Q3 filings now exist, but our fixed 17-manager Q3 panel is still being reconciled for amendments, reporting-group changes and corporate actions. We do not mix a partial Q3 panel with this completed Q1-to-Q2 comparison.
- Scope: 1,396 manager–security observations that were present and comparable in both quarters. We exclude ETFs/ETPs, options, debt, warrants, preferred shares and other non-operating-company instruments under our standing method.
- Corporate actions: share counts are adjusted where verified splits or other actions would otherwise create a false quantity change. Unresolved identifiers or quantity anomalies remain outside the clean comparison.
- Reporting groups: related accounts and combination reports are reconciled to avoid double counting. Pershing Square’s Q1 and Q2 filing structure is one example where the reporting entity changed and required explicit treatment.
- Interpretation: the result is not unique assets under management, portfolio return, cost basis, realized gain, trade date, motive, conviction, short exposure or total assets. Prices also affect the implied unit values used in the bridge.
For the bridge construction and row-level exclusions, see our Q1-to-Q2 value-change decomposition. For the separate price/valuation side of the bridge, see the issuer valuation-effect concentration analysis. The Guru research hub keeps the panel definitions and related reports together.
Sources and original documents
SEC, Frequently Asked Questions About Form 13F (updated March 6, 2026); SEC Form 13F and instructions; SEC Form 13F data sets; Official List of Section 13(f) Securities, Q2 2026.
Direct filing indexes, Q1 / Q2 2026:
Appaloosa Q1 / Q2; Whale Rock Q1 / Q2; Light Street Q1 / Q2; Altimeter Q1 / Q2; Soros Q1 / Q2; DME Q1 / Q2; Pershing management Q1, combination report Q1 / Q2; Coatue Q1 / Q2; Bridgewater Q1 / Q2; ARK Q1 / Q2; Berkshire Q1 / Q2; Tiger Q1 / Q2; Third Point Q1 / Q2; Situational Awareness Q1 / Q2; Icahn Q1 / Q2; Fundsmith Q1 / Q2; Dalal Street Q1 / Q2.
AHNIM STUDIO calculation from the cited filings. This article is for information and education, not investment advice. Data and assumptions can be revised if a filing amendment or a verified corporate action changes the normalized comparison.
